Some time ago, I
posted an article on suicide in the Bible, specifically with reference to the story of Samson and why Samson is a hero of faith if he committed the sin of suicide. Ultimately, I came to the conclusion - the same many commentators have come to over the centuries - that Samson's suicide was not a suicide in the proper sense because his primary motive in pushing over the pillars was not to kill himself, but to destroy his enemies and the Philistine temple. Per the principle of double-effect, he was willing to accept his own death as an inevitable but unintended consequence of his actions.
Following this article, a reader brought to my attention the question of Razis in 2 Maccebees, which had escaped my attention when I was putting together the Samson article. Razis was a Jewish elder who committed suicide in order to escape being captured by the Greek soldiers of Nicanor during the persecution of Antiochus IV Epiphanes; his gruesome death is recounted in 2 Maccebees 14. In the case of Razis, we are presented with a greater difficulty because, unlike Samson, it is very hard to discern any principle of double-effect at work. Let us look at the passage in detail from 2 Maccebees chapter 14:
"A certain Razis, one of the elders of Jerusalem, was denounced to Nicanor as a patriot. A man highly regarded, he was called a father of the Jews because of his goodwill toward them. In the days before the revolt, he had been convicted of being a Jew, and had risked body and soul in his ardent zeal for Judaism. Nicanor, to show his disdain for the Jews, sent more than five hundred soldiers to arrest him. He thought that by arresting that man he would deal the Jews a hard blow.
But when the troops, on the point of capturing the tower, were forcing the outer gate and calling for fire to set the door ablaze, Razis, now caught on all sides, turned his sword against himself, preferring to die nobly rather than fall into the hands of vile men and suffer outrages unworthy of his noble birth. In the excitement of the struggle he failed to strike exactly. So while the troops rushed in through the doors, he gallantly ran up to the top of the wall and courageously threw himself down into the crowd. But as they quickly drew back and left an opening, he fell into the middle of the empty space. Still breathing, and inflamed with anger, he got up and ran through the crowd, with blood gushing from his frightful wounds. Then, standing on a steep rock,as he lost the last of his blood, he tore out his entrails and flung them with both hands into the crowd, calling upon the Lord of life and of spirit to give these back to him again. Such was the manner of his death." (2 Macc. 14:37-46).
So we clearly are dealing with a suicide here. As in the case of Samson, it appears to be affirmed as the morally appropriate course of action. Unlike the case of Samson, Razis' actions are apparently done solely for the purpose of ending his own life; there is no external end to his actions (such as destroying the Temple of Dagon in the case of Samson). He is simply killing himself to avoid being shamed.
It is amusing that the NAB tries to get around this problem by calling Razis obvious suicide a "martyrdom." If that were the case, it is a completely novel definition of "martyrdom." By that definition, St. Agnes could have just slit her own wrists to avoid the impure intentions of her persecutors, or St. Cyprian could have taken cyanide in his villa and both still be considered martyrs. Clearly this is an attempt to just skirt the issue by the NAB editorial staff, who are not known for their erudition.
Presuming we are working under the assumption that the moral law is universal and that it is not acceptable to suggest that Scripture contradicts the Church's moral teachings, it seems there are three possible ways we can look at this passage:
1) The Bible merely reports Razis suicide without affirming it as morally acceptable.
2) The Bible affirms Razis suicide as morally acceptable, but in fact it is not.
3) The Bible affirms Razis suicide as morally acceptable, and in fact it is, because it is not suicide in the proper sense.
Option 1 would have us take the position that the suicide of Razis is not actually being affirmed at all; the Bible is merely reporting that it happened without making a judgment upon it. This is a common interpretive principle when dealing with morality in Scripture. For example, the Old Testament merely reports the existence of slavery and polygamy without ever morally affirming them as positive institutions. If this principle applies in the case of Razis, we have no difficulty; it is in the same category as the polygamy of Jacob or the slavery Solomon imposed upon some of his subjects.
The problem with this position is that the text seems to actually affirm Razis; it says he acted "nobly", "courageously" and was "gallant." The presence of these descriptors makes it difficult to say that the Scriptures are not affirming Razis' actions.
Of course, one could save this position by noting that while affirmative language is used, none of it is used with reference to Razis' suicide directly; rather, it is used with reference to the way he runs, jumps, and refuses to allow himself to fall into the hands of his captors. While this might be technically true, no language really allows for this sort of thing in practice. For example, can you imagine describing how a bank robber "courageously" leap out the window, "skillfully" ran down the street from the police and "dexterously" handled his firearm? Even if these descriptors did not apply to the act of the bank robbery itself, anyone reading such an account would naturally presume the author was affirming the deeds of the robber. It would be difficult to suggest that the presence of such affirmative language did not constitute an affirmation of the robbery itself. Therefore, if affirmation, silence or condemnation are our only options, it seems that Option 1 is not tenable.
Option 2 would solve the difficulty by appealing to the differentiation between Jewish and Christian thinking on the problem of suicide. The ancient Jews had a society in which shame was a considerable disincentive to certain actions. Because of this, the ancient Jews viewed suicide as a licit way to escape situations that were considered extraordinarily shameful. In this case, Razis is fears the shame that would follow if he were to "suffer outrages unworthy of his noble birth." Therefore, he prefers suicide. This was acceptable in Razis' time, but today it would not be acceptable. Christianity, in contrast to Judaism, fears sin much more than shame, and Christians from the New Testament on have frequently allowed themselves to be shamed and debased by their persecutors but would refuse to do anything that might lead them to sin. Therefore, we are dealing with two different moral systems, and this explains the difficulty.
This is a very common solution to the problem of Razis' suicide, but it assumes that there are two distinct moral systems for the Old and New Testaments. While Catholic Teaching affirms that the New Testament revelation is more complete than the Old, it is not permissible to posit that Old and New Testament moralities may actually contradict one another. This is why Christ makes a point to emphasize that while the Old Testament tolerated divorce, it was never affirmed as good (cf. Matt. 19:8). It is one thing to say the New Testament completes the Old; it is another thing to say it contradicts the Old. To say the suicide was noble in the Old Testament but a sin in the New is a blatant contradiction. Jewish culture at the time of Christ may have viewed suicide as a noble option, but Divine Revelation never has. Since Divine Revelation in the New Testament teaches unambiguously the immorality of suicide, we must affirm this as true in the Old as well. Therefore, we cannot seriously consider Option 2, since it presupposes that natural law can change from one age to another. It is a modernist solution to the problem.
In Option 3 we have the pretty straightforward solution that the reason Razis suicide is presented positively is because it was a morally acceptable act. Like the "suicide" of Samson, Razis' suicide was not suicide in the strict sense. The principle of double-effect means no suicide actually happened.
The principle of double-effect is a moral concept from Catholic Tradition which states that it is permissible to cause harm as a side effect (or “double effect”) of bringing about a good result even though it would not be permissible to cause such harm as a primary means to bringing about the same good end. St. Thomas Aquinas explains it this way:
“Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention. Now moral acts take their species according to what is intended, and not according to what is beside the intention, since this is accidental as explained above (43, 3; I-II, 12, 1). Accordingly the act of self-defense may have two effects, one is the saving of one's life, the other is the slaying of the aggressor” (II-II, Q. 64, art. 7).
As mentioned in the
original article on Samson, Samson's primary goal is to bring down the Temple of the Philistines and defeat his enemies; he accepts his death as a predictable but unavoidable "double effect" of his primary act, similar to the way a soldier falls on a grenade to shelter a comrade. He knows the action will cost him his life, but the
purpose of the action is not to take his own life, but to save his comrade.
Similarly, so one could argue, Razis did not fall on his sword, jump off a building, disembowel himself and hurl his guts at his oppressors because he wanted to end his own life; rather, his purpose was to avoid having to "suffer outrages unworthy of his noble birth." Therefore, this act was not suicide and hence does not present a problem.
If you have a difficulty with that line of thinking, you are not alone. I don't buy it either. Here's why.
When the principle of double-effect is invoked, there is a primary end that is intended and a secondary effect that is tolerated. Typically, the primary end is something extrinsic to the agent. Samson's primary end is the destruction of the temple, which is something extrinsic to himself, as is the situation with the soldier who falls on the grenade - the end goal of saving his comrade's life is extrinsic to himself.
Why is this distinction important? If we allow that double-effect can be invoked if the primary end is intrinsic to the agent, then almost anything becomes permissible. For example, consider all the ways this could be twisted as applying to the question of suicide:
"His primary end was not to end his life, but to escape his mental suffering."
"His primary end was not to end his life, but to get out of the punishment he was afraid of."
"His primary end was not to end his life, but to spite his enemy."
"His primary end was not to end his life, but to escape the pain brought on by his terminal illness."
"His primary end was not to end his life, but to end the boredom of his existence."
"His primary end was not to end his life, but to get out of the heartache brought on by his unfaithful lover."
Catholic Tradition has never accepted any of these situations as valid applications of the principle of double-effect, for the simple reason that all of them are intrinsic to the agent. To admit otherwise would be deny the fundamental unity of human action. When the primary end is intrinsic to the agent, the primary end and the double-effect are too difficult to distinguish, especially when the primary end is supposed to be morally desirable while the double-effect is not. This is similar to the reason why, according to Aquinas, a man may not commit a sin whilst simultaneously repenting of it; repentance must follow sin sequentially because a man might not at the same time will evil while willing to repent of the evil he is committing.
There is also the matter of proportionality. The unintended consequence must not be out of proportion to the primary end; a man may not blow up his city in order to destroy a single hornet's nest, nor may he take his head off in a wood chipper in order to give himself a hair cut. In the example of Razis, it is questionable whether it is proportional to commit suicide in order to avoid being shamed in a manner not befitting one's noble birth.
So none of the three options present above are acceptable. Have we been totally stumped here? Fortunately, no. I believe there is an Option 4, and that the solution is found in the text itself, in conjunction with an important caveat on the Church's teaching on suicide.
4) The Bible neither affirms nor condemns Razis, but sympathizes with his plight; while neither affirming the objective evil of his suicide, it acknowledges it was a very difficult position for any man to be in and holds out the hope that Razis' culpability for this act may have been diminished or even eliminated by virtue of the difficulty of his circumstances.
It has always been understood that nobody takes their own life unless something is gravely wrong, either with themselves or in their circumstances. That Catechism states that certain circumstances can mitigate the guilt of one who has committed suicide:
"Grave psychological disturbances, anguish, or grave fear of hardship, suffering, or torture can diminish the responsibility of the one committing suicide" (CCC 2282).
The Catechism mentions fear of suffering or torture as factors that can diminish responsibility. The persecution of Antiochus IV Epiphanes chronicled in 2 Maccebees was exceptionally brutal; the tortures inflicted on obstinate Jews were horrendous, as anyone who has ever read the text of 2 Maccabees 7 of the widow with her seven sons knows. Because the persecution was so harsh and the tortures inflicted by the persecutors so horrible, the sacred author goes beyond a mere cold recitation of the facts; he clearly sympathizes with the plight of Razis, who through fear of what might be inflicted upon him, seems driven to a course of action he never would have contemplated in normal circumstances. Because Razis was so noble in character, the Scripture mentions his bravery, gallantry, etc. His suicide is recorded neither affirmatively nor with condemnation, but as a tragedy in the life of a man who was put into a moral dilemma no person should have to endure.
Can we say for certain that in this case the culpability for his suicide is wiped away? The Scripture text stops short of explicitly affirming the moral acceptability of Razis' suicide, as we have seen above. There is no doubt, however, that Razis believes he actions are pleasing to God. This is clear because it says that, after flinging away his entrails, he called upon God to return them to him again at the Resurrection. Were he conscious of committing a grave sin, he would not have done so. That is, he ends his life with a clear conscience, and the Scriptures seem to affirm that he was a just man and that we can have hope for his salvation.
Therefore, the ultimate solution to the problem is that Razis provides us with a example of a suicide where culpability may be diminished. If Samson is an example of the principle of double-effect as relating to losing one's own life, and Saul and Judas are examples of culpable suicide, Razis is an example of a suicide which remains a malum but where the culpa is mitigated, a hypothesis the Church has always acknowledged possible.
This is different from the double-effect hypothesis we looked at with Samson; in Samson's case, due to the principle of double-effect, there is no suicide in the formal sense. In Razis' case, there is a formal act of suicide, but the Scripture seems to hold out the possibility that Razis' culpability for this act was diminished due to his circumstances. This is also different from the "Scripture is merely recording, not affirming" argument, because the Scriptures are in fact sympathizing with Razis, though they stop short of affirming the act of suicide itself. It's affirmative language and statements about the Resurrection give us grounds for hope; it's silence on his act of death itself leave the traditional condemnation of suicide intact.
It is an admittedly difficult problem, but not insoluble given a background in Catholic moral theology.